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How can artiﬁcial life (AL) advance scientiﬁc understanding? Is AL best seen
as a new discipline, or as a collection of novel computational methods that can
be applied to old problems? And given that the products of AL research range
from abstract existence proofs to working robots to detailed simulation models,
are there standards of quality or usefulness that can be applied across the whole
ﬁeld? On September 16th 1999 in Lausanne, Switzerland, a debate on these
questions was held as part of the Fifth European Conference on Artiﬁcial Life.
As the organizers, we wanted to foster a constructive discussion regarding the
scientiﬁc status, and future, of AL. We were well aware that some of these issues
had been raised before (e.g., Miller, 1995) but we felt that earlier treatments
had perhaps not reached a wide enough audience. The format for the debate
consisted of contributions from invited panelists followed by an open discus-
sion. The panelists were Chris Langton, Mark Bedau, Simon Kirby, and Inman
Harvey—Hiroaki Kitano was scheduled to participate but regrettably could not
1attend the conference.
We started by sketching a continuum of approaches to AL as science: at one
extreme, there are researcherswho use techniques such as genetic algorithms and
animat-style simulations to look at existing problems. Typically the problems
come from within biology. The work of Kitano and his colleagues (e.g., 1997) on
morphogenesis in Drosophila is one example. We see this work as exemplifying
the idea of AL as a method, or a collection of methods, that could (at least
in theory) be put to use by investigators in many diﬀerent ﬁelds. At the other
extreme is the view that AL opens up whole new ways of thinking; that it is a
discipline in itself. An example of this is Ray’s 1994 work on Tierra, that Ray
and some other commentators have taken to raise fundamental issues about
what it means to call a system alive.
If the existence of the continuum is granted, two questions are raised. First,
are all of the possible positions along it tenable? The skeptic might ask whether
computer simulations of the kind developed by AL researchers ever add anything
to existing formal methods in a discipline like biology. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, one might be cynical about the possibility of objectively studying “life
as it could be.” The second question concerns quality: how can we distinguish
good work from bad? The two questions are not independent: if one sees AL
research as some kind of thought experiment, one’s quality criteria may well
diﬀer from those of someone who is interested in more-or-less precise models of
real-world systems.
These were the terms within which we framed the debate. We then encour-
aged each panelist to present his own views on the ﬁeld, and requested that the
audience return to questions about the scope of AL and the problem of quality
in the open discussion.
Chris Langton (The Swarm Corporation) began by oﬀering deﬁnitions of
terms such as “method,” “discipline,” and “tool” that had been used in the
2debate abstract.1 He argued that methods and disciplines typically overlap,
and thus deciding whether AL is one or the other is a moot point. The key
question is whether or not there exist research topics unique to AL. Langton
answered this in the aﬃrmative: AL’s unique content is the study of synthesis.
He noted that synthetic methods had originated with the pioneers of computing
(Turing and von Neumann) but had not been taken up until many years later.
Synthesis allows the investigator to go beyond the phenomena that happen to
exist in Nature, and to create new phenomena. Langton argued that theoretical
biology, for example, should be about the organisms and ecosystems that might
evolve if we could “replay the tape.” Thus AL gives us access to the possible as
well as the actual, allowing us to discover laws of greater generality.
Mark Bedau (Dept. of Philosophy, Reed College, Oregon) described his
interest in the fundamental properties of living systems. He argued that one
proﬁtable use of AL techniques is to allow us to ﬁnd the simplest system capable
of reproducing some key property of life, such as hierarchical emergence or
unbounded complexity. Discovering such a minimal system would have obvious
beneﬁts for our understanding of the property in question. Bedau felt that AL,
in this mode at least, deals in computational thought experiments rather than
realistic simulations. He claimed that the way to keep these models grounded
in reality is to develop operational metrics for the phenomena of interest, and,
using these metrics, to compare artiﬁcial systems to their natural analogues.
Bedau concluded by noting that the long-run success of his approach is an
empirical question that turns on facts about how the universe is organized: will
simple general principles allow us to explain many natural systems, or is the
devil in the details?
Simon Kirby (Dept. of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh) pointed out
that, although the majority of extant work in AL is related to biology, the
1For the original abstract and other materials associated with the debate, refer to
http://www-abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/users/noble/ECALDebate/
3perspective that AL methods aﬀord can illuminate problems from many ﬁelds.
Kirby pointed out that the study of language has involved explicit but incompat-
ible idealizations about what language is. For example, Chomsky’s idealization
of language as the knowledge of a single speaker in a homogeneous speech com-
munity at a particular point in time contrasts with the historical idealization
of language as a community-wide phenomenon subject to static laws of change.
Kirby expressed the hope that the special perspective provided by AL might
unify these competing idealizations by modelling explicitly how local interac-
tions can give rise to global phenomena. In this way AL can throw new light
on disciplines outside biology.
Inman Harvey (Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics,
University of Sussex) expressed the opinion that AL is not a discipline in it-
self, nor should it be. He pointed out that crossover between disciplines leading
to “ﬂaky speculations and hot air” may be one of the great beneﬁts of AL as a
movement. Harvey cautioned that AL should not expect overnight acceptance
by other sciences. He mentioned the series of workshops entitled “Towards a
Theoretical Biology” organized by C. H. Waddington in the late 1960s—today,
the contents of these workshops would be recognized as AL, tackling the same
topics, although without the aid of powerful computers. It has taken time for
the methods and questions of theoretical biology to become an accepted part of
biology. Similarly, we can expect that it will take a period of decades before the
methods and questions of contemporary AL will be widely accepted. The best
way to encourage this acceptance is to work directly with biologists. Harvey
concluded by stressing that, while pursuing this goal, AL researchers should
continue to explore crossover between disciplines and generate the “ﬂaky stuﬀ”
that such interdisciplinary interaction often results in.
Several themes were touched upon in the ensuing open discussion. Pleasingly
one of these was the question of how to judge whether AL research was of high
4quality. Three clear types of answer were put forward.
Mark Bedau expanded on his argument that well-deﬁned operational met-
rics, sensitive to the phenomena claimed to be central to AL, must be con-
structed. He gave the example of open-ended evolution. How are we to measure
the potential for open-ended evolution in an artiﬁcial system such as Tierra?
How are we to compare this measure to that of a natural system such as the
fossil record? Once a metric is established, researchers will be in a position to
assess the ability of models to account for naturally observed phenomena and
to construct the simplest model possible that exhibits these phenomena.
Chris Langton raised the notion of a model’s ability to allow new predictions
to be made and subsequently tested in the real world. He gave the example of
the power law distribution of extinction events manifested by coevolutionary
models and the subsequent prediction that natural extinction events should
obey a similar law.
Takashi Ikegami (University of Tokyo) suggested that rather than merely
providing predictions of what must be the case in living systems, i.e., describing
the unifying features of “life as it could be,” AL research should also attempt to
provide negative hypotheses: “life as it cannot be.” With claims such as these
in hand, biologists are in a position to falsify the AL models that gave rise to
them, and hence move AL forward.
Much of the debate focussed on whether AL systems were best thought of
as models, experiments, automated thought experiments, intuition pumps, or
conceptual frameworks, and what inﬂuence this might have on how to design
and assess such systems. Whilst the ﬁeld as a whole appears to be far from
a consensus on this issue, the notion that a plurality of approaches is healthy
seems widespread. Inman Harvey suggested that the most abstract AL models
might be best construed as attempts to build new calculi, new tools with which
to address problems from theoretical biology or elsewhere.
5Issues that remained unresolved, and that are perhaps ripe for further de-
bate, include how to ensure that the status of an AL system (automated thought
experiment vs. nascent calculus, for instance) is clearly understood and con-
veyed, and how the status of an AL system has implications for what conclusions
can be legitimately drawn from the system.
An issue upon which most of the discussants were in agreement concerned
the scope of AL’s subject matter. The panelists and audience agreed with Simon
Kirby’s assertion that AL, like complex systems theory, had a positive contri-
bution to oﬀer to many disciplines, including philosophy, linguistics, economics,
psychology, geography, archaeology and even theology.
There was less agreement as to whether there were questions central to AL
that were not also the concern of other disciplines, i.e., a core of research topics
unique to AL. Whilst some contributors saw all AL as ultimately taking place
within and augmenting some established research paradigm, typically theoret-
ical biology, others saw the potential for AL to reveal unifying principles that
were eﬀective across disciplines that were otherwise unrelated—thus, AL might
reveal fundamental similarities between economies and ecologies. Other contrib-
utors allowed that the development and assessment of AL tools and techniques
might be considered to be central to AL in much the same way that the de-
velopment and assessment of statistical tools by statisticians is to some extent
divorced from their application in ﬁelds such as psychology or physics.
Questions of AL’s application in other disciplines immediately raised what
was perceived to be a serious problem: how can AL perspectives, models and
techniques come to gain acceptance in these other ﬁelds? Titus Brown (Caltech)
related that ﬁnding collaborators from within relevant research ﬁelds may take
time, but that such collaboration can result in work with added credibility.
Inman Harvey stressed that conservative models which only minimally perturb
orthodox paradigms may have the greatest chance of success; whether this is
6the only way forward is perhaps a topic for future debate. What appears clear
is that AL as a science is seeking ways of interfacing and interacting with other
sciences, and that there are interesting and challenging problems to be faced in
the course of this enterprise.
In closing, we would like to raise two issues which emerged from the debate
for further discussion, perhaps in a similar debate at some future AL conference.
First, given that it was generally felt that the success of AL research as sci-
ence might be measured by its impact on other disciplines, what do scientists
from other disciplines want from AL? We suspect that these scientists do not
just want to be shown examples of phenomena similar to their own instantiated
on computers. They want answers to questions which they ﬁnd hard to address
with the techniques at their disposal; answers to questions such as why is hu-
man language the only signalling system yet documented to exhibit recursive,
compositional syntax? Why do the extinction events evidenced by the fossil
record exhibit the particular pattern that they do? It would be advantageous to
have a way of dividing such questions into those amenable to an AL approach
and those not so amenable. Must we merely attempt each project and see what
happens, or can we oﬀer principled criteria for the successful application of AL
methods?
The second issue poses a related question: what kind of answers can AL
research provide? A typical characterisation of AL is as a source of new data
points; a way of widening an empirical database by providing synthetic examples
of the natural phenomenon of interest. When augmented by data from AL,
a discipline can separate the regularities which underlie all possible cases of
a phenomenon from the idiosyncrasies of the particular natural examples we
happen to have access to. However, many of the discussants at this debate do not
see their work as a source of empirical data. They see it as a source of new ways
of thinking, or novel intuitions; as a way of testing the coherence of theories, or
7of generating other non-empirical results. Is it time to forgo the philosophically
rather diﬃcult notion that the systems developed by AL researchers have the
same status as the natural phenomena they seek to resemble? We believe that
these artiﬁcial systems are more like conventional models, built in order to clarify
and extend theories of natural phenomena, rather than to augment natural
phenomena with artiﬁcial brethren.
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